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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

v.

:

LOUIE EDWIN SIMS,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No.

890463-CA

Priority No. 2

:

SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This appeal is from a conviction of possession of a
controlled substance with intent to distribute for value, a
second degree felony, after a bench trial in the Fourth Judicial
District Court.

This Court has appellate jurisdiction in this

matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1990).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL
Whether this Court should remand the case for
additional factual findings without determining the
constitutionality of the roadblock stop?
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
The factual findings underlying the trial court's
ruling on a motion to suppress will not be disturbed on appeal
unless they are clearly erroneous; however, in assessing the
trial court's legal conclusions based on its factual findings,
the appellate court applies a "correction of error" standard of
review.

State v. Johnson, 771, P.2d 326, 327 (Utah Ct. App.)

cert, granted,

P.2d

(Utah 1989).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant, Louie Edwin Sims, was charged with
possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute
for value, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann.
S 58-37-8(1)(a)(i) (Supp. 1988) (R. 7). Defendant was convicted
as charged after a bench trial based on stipulated facts on June
20, 1989, in the Fourth Judicial District Court, in and for Juab
County, State of Utah, the Honorable George E. Ballif, presiding
(R. 142-45).

Defendant was sentenced by Judge Ballif on July 28,

1989, to serve a term of one to fifteen years in the Utah State
Prison and ordered to pay a fine of $1,250 and an additional
$312.50 to the Victim's Reparation Fund.

Id.

Defendant's prison

sentence was suspended and he was placed on probation for a
period of eighteen months.

Id.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The facts are fully stated in the Brief of Respondent.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
There are three reasons this Court should remand the
case to the trial court without a determination of the legality
of the roadblock stop.

First, the trial court can effectively

determine whether defendant's voluntary consent came by
exploitation of the roadblock stop by assuming arguendo that the
stop was illegal.

Second, even if this Court determined the

roadblock stop was illegal, a remand is inevitable to consider
exploitation.

Third, the trial court's factual findings on the

roadblock stop are inadequate for this Court to conduct
meaningful review.

Thus, a determination of the legality of the

roadblock stop at this juncture is unnecessary.

ARGUMENT
THIS COURT SHOULD REMAND THE CASE
FOR ADDITIONAL FACTUAL FINDINGS
In his supplemental brief, defendant requests this
Court to reverse and remand this case to the district court to
determine if the evidence seized from the search of his vehicle
was obtained through exploitation of the roadblock stop.

(See

Supplemental Brief of Appellant at 13). The State concedes that
at least a remand is necessary for a full factual inquiry and
determination on the issue of exploitation.

However, this Court

need not determine the legality of the roadblock stop as a
prerequisite to a remand.
As this Court is aware, the fate of the present case
was altered by the Utah Supreme Court's recent decision in State
v. Arroyo, 137 Utah Adv. Rep. 13 (Utah June 28, 1990).

In

Arroyo, the district court determined that no traffic violation
had occurred and that the police officer had stopped the
defendant only as a pretext.

Jd. at 13. However, the district

court also ruled that the "defendant consented to the search of
the vehicle."

.Id. Nevertheless, the district court granted the

defendant's suppression motion,

^d.

The State appealed to this

Court, challenging the district court's suppression order.

Id.

This Court reversed the district court's suppression order on the
basis that defendant's voluntary consent to search vitiated the
taint of the unconstitutional pretext stop.

State v. Arroyo, 770

P.2d 153 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
The Utah Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed
this Court's ruling.

State v. Arroyo, 137 Utah Adv. Rep. at 18.

The reason for reversal was that the trial court's finding of
consent lacked any evidentiary support.

Id. at 14.

Consequently, the Supreme Court remanded the case to the district
court for an evidentiary hearing on the issue of consent.

Id. at

18.
In order to assist the district court in its inquiry,
the Supreme Court explained the parameters of the consent issue
to be explored by the district court on remand.

Id.

at 15. The

Supreme Court stated that there are two factors to be considered
in determining whether consent is lawfully obtained following
initial police misconduct: (1) whether the consent was voluntary;
and (2) whether the consent was obtained by police exploitation
of the prior illegality.

Ici. (citing 3 W. LaFave, Search and

Seizure § 8.2(d), at 190 (2d ed. 1987).

As the basis for the

second part of the two-part analysis, the Court relied upon the
"fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine of Wong Sun v. United
States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963).

Id.

The Wong Sun test considers

M

'whether, granting establishment of the primary illegality, the

evidence to which instant objection is made has been come at by
exploitation of that illegality or instead by means sufficiently
distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint.'"

371 U.S. at

488 (quoting Maguire, Evidence of Guilt 221 (1959)).
In the present case, the State produced evidence of
defendant's consent and the trial court specifically found "no
evidence of coercion or duress to undermine the voluntary
character of the consent given to the search of the car,
including the trunk where marijuana was found" (R. Ill) (T. 11,

13).

Admittedly, however, the trial court did not inquire

whether, assuming the roadblock stop was illegal, defendant's
voluntary consent was obtained by exploitation of that illegality
or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to vitiate any
taint.

See Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 488. Of course, this inquiry

was not made because the trial court found the roadblock stop
constitutional under both the fourth amendment to the United
States Constitution and article I, section 14 of the Utah
Constitution.

The trial court simply inferred that if the

roadblock was legal, defendant's voluntary consent was not
obtained by exploitation.
The primary issue this Court must now determine is
whether it is necessary to decide the roadblock issue at this
juncture.

It is not.

First, it is unnecessary to conclusively

determine the legality of the roadblock stop prior to determining
whether voluntary consent was obtained by exploitation.

On

remand, the trial court can conduct its factual inquiry into the
exploitation issue assuming arguendo that the stop was illegal.
All relevant factors surrounding defendant's consent can be
explored under the parameters set forth by the Utah Supreme Court
in Arroyo.

By utilizing this method, the two-part Arroyo test

can be applied without reaching the roadblock issue.
Second, even if this Court were to determine that the
roadblock was unconstitutional, the case should, as defendant
suggests, be remanded to the trial court for a determination
whether defendant's voluntary consent was obtained through
exploitation.
Third, the evidence developed in the trial court and
that court's findings on the roadblock issue are inadequate for
this Court to conduct a detailed constitutional analysis as was
done by the United States Supreme Court in Michigan Department of
State Police v. Sitz, 110 S.Ct. 2481 (1990).

Therefore, a

determination of the constitutionality of the roadblock based on
this record would be imprudent, in addition to being unnecessary.
If the Court believes the roadblock issue needs to be resolved,
the case should be remanded to the trial court for the
development of evidence on that issue and for further factual and
legal determination in light of Sitz.

Cf. State v. Lovegren, No.

890350-CA, slip op. at 8-9 (Utah Ct. App. Sept. 11, 1990) (a

This procedure is not unlike the two-prong ineffectiveness test
of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 697 (1984), under
which a reviewing court need not consider whether counsel
rendered ineffective assistance if it is shown that no prejudice
could have resulted. Likewise, in the present case, if the trial
court determines on remand that defendant's voluntary consent was
not obtained by exploitation of the stop, then it need not
further examine the legality of the roadblock. This alternate
method is suggested because it may often be easier for a trial
court to dispose of a suppression motion by determining whether
consent was obtained by exploitation of a stop, without
determining the legality of the stop.

remand for more detailed findings is in order where a trial
court's findings in a suppression ruling are inadequate to permit
meaningful review on appeal).
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, the State respectfully
requests this Court to remand the case to the trial court to
determine whether defendant's voluntary consent came by way of
exploitation of the roadblock stop.
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